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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Anthony Kyle Blaine Smith appeals from the district court's order affirming the 
magistrate court's order denying his suppression motion. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
The district court adopted the following factual background, found by the 
magistrate court and largely undisputed, for this case: 
On December 10, 2013, Boise City Police Officers responded to a report 
of a runaway at a shed located on the property of a Boise residence. The 
dispatch information regarding the report related that a 20 year old male 
(Smith) lived in the shed on the property and was harboring a 15 year old 
runaway with whom Smith had a valid No Contact Order. Officers 
contacted Smith at the residence/shed (hereinafter shed) and Smith 
allowed them access to the shed; however the Officers did not find the 
juvenile runaway. 
Later that day, Officers received a second report from dispatch that a 
juvenile probation officer provided information that the female juvenile was 
at the shed and that Smith may have hidden her in a hole beneath the 
floorboards. Upon the officers['] return to the property, they heard a 
"commotion inside (the shed) as if furniture was being moved." The 
officers announced and, after a "minute" delay, Smith opened the door of 
the shed and exited. When confronted with the information regarding the 
juvenile's presence on the property, Smith stated to the officers "Yeah, 
she's here." After some discussion related to pulling up the floorboards of 
the shed that concealed the hole, officers entered the shed, secured the 
juvenile, and arrested Smith. Officers did not have a warrant permitting 
them to enter the shed. During a search of Smith incident to his arrest, 
officers located what was ultimately determined to be Marijuana, a 
Schedule I Controlled Substance. 
(R., pp.146-47 (brackets original) (punctuation standardized).) 
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The state charged Smith with violation of a no-contact order, harboring a 
runaway, and possession of marijuana. (R., pp.7-9.) Smith filed a motion to suppress 
the evidence, arguing that the warrantless search of his shed was unlawful. (R., pp.36-
37, 42-47, 60-66.) The magistrate court denied Smith's suppression motion. (R., 
pp.79-84.) Smith thereafter entered a conditional guilty plea to the charges, reserving 
the right to appeal from the magistrate court's order denying his suppression motion. 
(R., p.86.) The magistrate court entered judgment against Smith and placed him on 
probation for a period of two years. (R., p.87.) 
Smith appealed to the district court (R., pp.92-94), and the district court affirmed 




Smith's statement of the issues on appeal is found at page 4 of his Appellant's 
brief and is lengthy. The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Smith failed to show error in the district court's intermediate appellate 
decision affirming the magistrate court's order denying his suppression motion? 
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ARGUMENT 
Smith Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Appellate Decision Affirming 
The Magistrate Court's Order Denying His Suppression Motion 
A Introduction 
While searching for a 15-year-old runaway girl, with information that she was 
being harbored by Smith, a 20-year-old male with a standing no contact order, and was 
hidden beneath the floorboards of Smith's shed, officers entered the shed without a 
warrant to recover the minor girl. (R., pp.146-47.) Smith challenged the warrantless 
entry in a suppression motion filed before the magistrate court. (R., pp.36-37, 42-47, 
60-66.) Determining that the warrant exceptions of both exigency and consent justified 
the warrantless entry, the magistrate court denied Smith's suppression motion. (R., 
pp.79-83.) Smith appealed to the district court and the court upheld the magistrate's 
order. (R., pp.146-55.) 
Arguing that the evidence found on Smith's person during a search incident to his 
arrest was fruit of an unlawful entry into his dwelling, Smith contends that the district 
court erred by upholding the magistrate court's order denying his suppression motion. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.5-8.) Application of the correct legal standards to the facts found 
below, however, shows no error in the district court's intermediate appellate decision. 
The district court's decision should be affirmed. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate appellate 
capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's decision." State v. 
DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709,711,184 P.3d 215,217 (Ct. App. 2008). The standard of review 
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of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion to suppress is 
challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court's findings of fact that are 
supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of constitutional 
principles to those facts. State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 843, 103 P.3d 454, 456 (2004). 
C. The Officers' Warrantless Entry Into Smith's Shed Was Justified Under An 
Exception To The Warrant Requirement 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects "[t]he right of 
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. An officer's warrantless 
entry into a residence is presumptively unreasonable unless it falls within a well-
recognized exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Barrett, 138 Idaho 290, 293, 
62 P.3d 214,218 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Pearson-Anderson, 136 Idaho 847,849, 41 
P.3d 275, 277 (Ct. App. 2001 ). The magistrate court correctly determined, and the 
district court correctly affirmed, that the warrant exceptions of both exigency and 
consent justified the warrantless entry under the totality of the circumstances of this 
case. 
1. The Warrant Exception Of Exigency Justified The Officers' Warrantless 
Entry Into Smith's Shed 
One exception to the warrant requirement occurs when the "exigencies of the 
situation" make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search 
is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 
385, 393-394 (1978). Under this exigent circumstances exception, "a warrantless 
intrusion may be justified by hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, or imminent destruction of 
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evidence, or the need to prevent a suspect's escape, or the risk of danger to the police 
or to other persons inside or outside the dwelling." Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 
100 (1990) (internal citation and quotation omitted). A court evaluating a claim that 
exigent circumstances justified a warrantless home entry should determine whether the 
facts known to the police, and the reasonable inferences drawn from those facts, would 
"warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken was 
appropriate. Pearson-Anderson, 136 Idaho at 850, 41 P.3d at 278. 
The reasonableness of the belief that an exigency exists is determined by the 
totality of the circumstances known to the police at the time of the entry. State v. 
Campbell, 104 Idaho 705, 711, 662 P.2d 1149, 1155 (Ct. App. 1983). While courts 
must scrutinize a claim of emergency to ensure that it is not a mere pretext for entries 
and searches that otherwise would require a warrant, courts should avoid second-
guessing police decisions made in legitimate belief that life may very well be at stake. 
Pearson-Anderson, 136 Idaho at 850, 41 P.3d at 278. "The calculus of reasonableness 
must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-
second judgments-in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving." 
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989). Therefore, reasonableness "must be 
judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 
20/20 vision of hindsight." ~ 
The warrant exception of exigency clearly applies in this case: Smith had hidden 
a 15-year-old minor, who had run away from home and with whom Smith had a valid no 
contact order, underneath the floorboards of his shed. (R., p.150.) On appeal Smith 
disagrees with this assessment, contending that the minor child whom he had hidden 
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beneath his floorboards was in no immediate danger. (Appellant's brief, pp.5-7.) But as 
noted by the district court, "[n]o child who has run away from her parent's supervision 
and who has taken refuge with another juvenile in the latter's home can be considered 
'safe;' that such action is fraught with danger is self-evident and requires no 
elaboration." (R., p.150 (quoting In the Interest of Moten, 242 So.2d 849, 856 (La. Ct. 
App. 1970)). The risk of danger to the child is objectively greater in such a case as this 
where officers had credible information that the runaway minor was at least hidden, if 
not trapped, in a hole beneath the floorboards of Smith's shed-especially where Smith 
was an adult male with a standing no contact order. (R., p.151, n.4.) The district court 
correctly upheld the magistrate's conclusion that the exigency exception to the warrant 
requirement applied under the facts of this case. 
2. The Officers' Warrantless Entry Into Smith's Shed Was Also Justified By 
Smith's Voluntary Consent 
Another clearly recognized exception to the warrant requirement is consent from 
an individual who has actual or apparent authority to submit to the search. Schneckloth 
v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (citations omitted); State v. Brauch, 133 Idaho 
215, 219, 984 P.2d 703, 707 (1999). The voluntariness of an individual's consent is a 
question of fact to be determined based upon the totality of the circumstances. 
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227. 
The voluntary consent exception to the warrant requirement also applies to this 
case. On appeal Smith challenges the district court's upholding of the magistrate's 
"conclusion" that Smith voluntarily consented to the police's entry into his shed. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.7-8.) But the voluntariness of consent is not a question of law; it is 
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a question of fact to be determined by all the surrounding circumstances. State v. 
Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796, 69 P.3d 1052, 1057 (2003). Smith has failed to show that 
the magistrate's factual finding that he voluntarily consented is clearly erroneous. 
Smith asserts that his consent was coerced by law enforcement making "a clear 
threat" that "somebody was going to be bitten by a dog" if they had to call one in. 
(Appellant's brief, p.8.) Even assuming, arguendo, that the officers' comments could be 
taken as "a clear threat," the district court recognized that this "comment was one of a 
number of factors the magistrate could consider on the question of voluntariness." (R., 
p.154.) But it was only one factor. 
Additional circumstances properly considered by the magistrate court in this case 
included the following facts: Smith had granted consent for the officers to search his 
shed earlier in the day. (R., p.82.) The officers were unable to locate the runaway 
minor during that initial encounter. (Id.) However, when they returned, they were 
armed with reliable information that Smith was hiding the girl in a hole under the 
floorboards of his shed. (Id.) They confronted Smith with this information and he 
admitted that he was hiding the juvenile. (R., p.80.) The officers requested Smith's 
assistance, asking him to tell her to come out, and Smith said "okay." (R., p.82.) Smith 
then explained to the officers how to remove the floorboards to recover the young girl 
and helped the officers do it. (R., pp.82-83.) The totality of these circumstances 
supports the magistrate's finding that Smith voluntarily consented. The district court 
correctly upheld the magistrate's conclusion that the consent exception to the warrant 
requirement applied under the facts of this case. 
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3. There Is No Basis To Suppress The Evidence Discovered During The 
Search Incident To Smith's Arrest 
Finally, Smith argues that the marijuana found during a search of his person 
incident to his arrest must be suppressed because, he asserts, the entry into his shed 
was unlawful. (Appellant's brief, p.8.) Smith's argument fails because, as shown 
above, the entry into Smith's shed was supported by both the exigency and consent 
exceptions to the warrant requirement. The district court correctly upheld the order of 
the magistrate court. The appellate decision of the district court should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
intermediate appellate decision, affirming the magistrate court's order denying Smith's 
motion to suppress. 
DATED this 3rd day of November, 2015. 
C 
9 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 3rd day of November, 2015, served two true 
and correct copies of the attached RESPONDENT'S BRIEF by placing the copies in the 
United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
LANCE L. FUISTING 
DEPUTY ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
200 W. FRONT STREET, SUITE 1107 
BOISE, ID 83702 
~R 
Deputy Attorney General 
RJS/dd 
10 
